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Torts Teaching: From Basic Training to Legal-Process 
Theory: Dominick Vetri, Tort Law and Practice 
Joseph A. Page* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When I was preparing to launch my career as a torts professor at 
the University of Denver College of Law in the fall of 1964, I found a 
rather thin menu of casebooks from which to choose. However, the 
editors of these tomes were towering figures in the field, a fact that 
more than made up for (and perhaps explained) the paucity of avail-
able teaching materials. The list included Prosser and Smith,l per-
fectly straight-forward in its approach and burnished by the recogni-
tion that its lead editor was the most influential torts scholar of the 
day;2 Seavey, Keeton, and Keeton,3 leavening a stolid devotion to the 
case method with an occasional and, for its day, innovative use of car-
toons;4 Green et al.,s with opinions and text uniquely paraded in fac-
tual categories such as public-service companies6 and horse-and-
buggy traffic/ Shulman and James,8 notable for employing a workers' 
compensation opinion as its engine9 and consigning intentional torts to 
the caboose/o and the "new kid on the block," Gregory and Kalven. l1 
• Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1. WILLIAM L. PROSSER & YOUNG B. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (3d 
ed. 1962). 
2. For an account of William L. Prosser's impact on the development of tort law, see G. 
EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY Ch, 5 (1980). 
3. WARREN A. SEAVEY, PAGE KEETON & ROBERTE. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1964). 
4. Id. at 7 (W. of S. swinging his hatchet); 355 (Mrs. Palsgraf and her daughters); and in-
side back cover (the "torts mountain"). 
5. LEON GREEN ET AL., CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1957). 
6. Id. at Ch. 5. 
7. Id. at Ch. 9, § 1. 
8. HARRY SHULMAN & FLEMING JAMES, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS (1952). 
9. SHULMAN & JAMES, supra note 8, at 1 (citing Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 
(N.Y. 1911) (holding the New York workmen's compensation act unconstitutional)). 
10. See SHULMAN & JAMES, supra note 8, at Ch. 8. 
127 
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Prosser and Smith would have been the safest selection, its heav-
ily-edited cases faithfully tracking the leading treatise in the field,12 
and its avowed aim to "be all things to all men,"13 underscoring, per-
haps unconsciously, that torts teaching was still pretty much a frater-
nity, and at the same time reflecting a marketing strategy the success 
of which would be difficult to criticize. Seavey and the brothers 
Keeton offered raw material for a "hide-the-ball" Socratic approach to 
the subject, as well as the only available teacher's manual. I4 Green 
featured what in my judgment was the most interesting selection of 
cases, both on their facts and in the variety of issues they raised, but 
making sense of the arrangement of the opinions seemed beyond the 
reach of one not schooled in the fundamentals of legal realism. IS Shul-
man and James provided a unique focus on tort law as a mechanism 
for distributing losses,16 but by the mid-1960's, the materials had be-
come woefully out of date. Gregory and Kalven, a soi-disant "case-
book with a view,"17 had the most contemporary feel to it, as well as 
rich chapters on personal-injury damagesl8 and defamation.19 As hap-
pens, I suspect, with most novices, I chose to go with the casebook 
that first exposed me to torts, Seavey, Keeton, and Keeton (although I 
eventually used the crucible of the classroom to test all but one of the 
original "fab five"). 
The panorama began to change in 1971 with the appearance of 
the Franklin and Rabin book,zo which rotated the torts world on a 
California/New York axis, and over the next three decades a new gen-
11. CHARLES O. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 
(1959). 
12. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1964). 
13. PROSSER & SMITH, supra note 1, at x. 
14. WARREN A. SEAVEY ET AL., NOTES FOR INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE WITH CASES ON 
TORTS (1957). 
15. For an instructive analysis of legal realism as embodied in the writings of Leon Green, 
see Allen E. Smith, Some Realism About a Grand Legal Realist: Leon Green, 56 TEX. L. REv. 479 
(1978). 
16. This reflected the approach to torts taken by Fleming James, Jr. For an analysis of the 
impact of James on the development of tort theory, see George L. Priest, The Invention of Enter-
prise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 461, 470-81 (1985). 
17. GREGORY & KALVEN, supra note 11, at vii. 
18. See id. at Ch. 7. This chapter was notable for its thoroughness and the seriousness with 
which it treated a subject often relegated to the periphery of the torts course. 
19. See id. at Ch. 13. The materials on defamation provided wonderfully instructive cover-
age of the historical evolution of the tort. For insight into what motivated the comprehensive-
ness of this chapter, see Harry Kalven, Jr., Torts Casebooks on Parade: The Authors Meet the Us-
ers, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 4, 16 (1973) ("The reason there is so damn much about defamation in 
our casebook is: I like it'''). 
20. MARCA. FRANKLIN & ROBERTL. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES (1971). 
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eration of torts teachers brought forth new materials offering a pano-
ply of fresh approaches and divergent viewpoints. It was as though 
legal publishers had resolved to heed Chairman Mao's deathless dic-
tum about "[l]etting a hundred flowers blossom.,,21 Today, the new-
comer to torts confronts a cornucopia of casebooks,22 and adventurous 
souls have the opportunity not only to use modern photocopying 
technology to assemble their own original materials, but also to mix 
and match opinions and text culled from various existing casebooks.23 
Those who feel the need to switch casebooks every few years in an ef-
fort to keep their pedagogy fresh (and I include myself in this group) 
must struggle with the same embarrassment of riches. 
It was in the course of my meanderings through the torts-
casebook landscape that I came upon Professor Dominick Vetri's entry 
in the field. 24 The quality that first attracted me was the way it fash-
ioned a user-friendly introduction to the study of law, to the unique-
ness of the common law, and to the centrality of process. The book 
demonstrated an unusual sensitivity to the bewilderment of beginners 
and made a special effort to anticipate their needs and concerns. Yet 
what made Vetri's approach particularly intriguing was that it man-
aged to play not only to nervous neophytes, but also to students in 
need of intellectual challenge. It did so by raising issues that stretched 
their minds by making them contemplate a larger canvas and think 
even more analytically than they would in striving to master basic tort 
doctrine and theory. The book's duality gives it a unique stamp and 
will provide the focus of this review. 
II. TORTS FOR TOTS 
Tort law has traditionally served as a teething ring for first-
semester, first-year students, who must, in the first weeks of the 
course, learn how to appreciate the importance of procedure, hone in 
on the operative facts of a case, frame issues with precision, distin-
guish holding from dictum, and analyze the reasons underpinning a 
judicial decision. Normally, the torts course pursues these goals in the 
context of opinions dealing with intentional torts25 because of their 
21. MAO TSE-TUNG, QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG 302 (1966) (the 
"Little Red Book"). Law publishers, however, clung stubbornly to their habit of attaching use-
less indices at the end of their casebooks. 
22. I count eighteen on my office shelves. 
23. The West Group offers the customized publishing of materials selected from West and 
Foundation Press casebooks. See Letter from Alice Mitchell, Custom Publishing Coordinator, 
West Group, to Law Professors (Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with the author). 
24. DOMINICK VETRI, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE (1998). 
25. See, e.g., VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 
Ch. 2-3 (10th ed. 2000). 
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relative simplicity. Vetri's resort to negligence cases as an introduc-
tory vehicle26 gave me momentary pause, but the clarity with which he 
presented the materials convinced me that at the outset of their expo-
sure to the subject, students could grab hold of the concept of negli-
gence and even begin to run with it. 
Opening the course in this way acts as a partial antidote to the 
current tendency at many institutions, including my own, to reduce 
the number of hours devoted to the first-year torts course. Where 
time is at a premium, it seems to me to make scant sense to spend sev-
eral weeks on the minutiae of battery, assault, false imprisonment, 
trespass, and related privileges and then have to race through, or omit 
altogether, some of the more significant aspects of negligence and 
strict liability. 
Indeed, Vetri's inclusion of boxed summaries and flow charts at 
strategic points in the text,27 "putting-it-all-together" and accom-
plishment notes at the end of every chapter,28 and an ample supply of 
practice problems29 does much more than help students through the 
subtleties of the subject (and thereby reduces the risk that they might 
fall by the wayside in the early weeks of the course). It also furnishes a 
welcome counterweight to the pressures that seek to push students 
into the panic-purchasing of commercial study aids. 
Commercial study aids sit like uninvited guests at the banquet 
table, and legal academics tend to ignore them, perhaps in the hope 
that they will go quietly away. Yet study aids remain a fact of law 
school life, so much so that each year they seem to multiply like weeds 
after a summer rain. Moreover, study aids assume a variety of com-
municative forms-such as flashcards, charts, audio cassettes and in-
teractive software-that go far beyond the paperback book or booklet 
and feature not only course outlines, but also case briefs, sample ques-
tions and answers, and assorted memory aids. 30 
In a 1989 Washington Monthly article criticizing the shallowness 
and misguidedness of study aids, Daniel Pink noted, "After spending 
upwards of $20,000 a year to learn to think like lawyers, students 
could be plunking down an extra 12 bucks to defeat the entire pur-
26. VETRI, supra note 24, at Ch. 1 ("An Overview of Negligence Law"). 
27. E.g., id. at 285 (duty flow chart), 605 (elements of assault). 
28. E.g., id. at § 2.07 ("Putting Breach of Duty Analysis Together"), 353 (accomplishment 
note on vicarious liability). 
29. E.g., id. at 352. 
30. I do not intend my criticism of "spoon-feeding" materials to apply to readings designed 
either to expose readers to the varieties of thinking about tort law or to enrich their understand-
ing of the subject in other ways. An excellent example of the former is ROBERT L. RABIN, 
PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW (4th ed. 1995); the best exemplification of the latter is KENNETH 
S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW (1997). 
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pose. ,,31 Although his numbers need updating, the basic point re-
mains valid. Experience suggests, however, that nervous 1Ls will re-
main vulnerable to the blandishments of publishers who play on their 
insecurities, to the advice they receive from purportedly knowledge-
able upper-class students, and to the highly competitive environment 
of law school. 
By including guideposts, bare-bones outlines, and summaries, 
the Vetri book offsets the pressures pushing students to purchase 
study aids. The presentation of basic concepts in a solid foundation 
created by the casebook's editor not only serves to reduce jitters, but 
also it assures both the relevance and the accuracy of these building-
block materials. At the same time, this approach enables and encour-
ages students to pursue issues more deeply. In feeling more comfort-
able with the basic concepts of tort law, students may be more easily 
persuaded to undertake the conversion of the bare-bones outlines in 
the casebook into points of departure for the exploration of more chal-
lenging pathways. 
What can assist the instructor in efforts to broaden the scope of 
the course beyond the confines of doctrine is the attention Vetri pays 
to the torts process. While his is not the first casebook with this as a 
major focus, the attention he pays to legal-process concerns that can 
provide a theme for the course gives the casebook its intellectual rigor. 
III. TORTS FOR GROWN-UPS 
The process issues raised by Vetri have their roots in what has 
come to be known as legal-process theory, a jurisprudential movement 
emerging from teaching materials developed by Harvard Law School 
Professors Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks,32 with important 
contributions from their colleague Lon L. Fuller.33 An important fea-
ture of legal-process theory was its careful focus on the processes by 
31. Daniel Pink, Law School Lite, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1989, at 20. 
32. The Hart & Sacks materials remained unpublished for decades although they formed 
the basis for courses offered at the Harvard Law School and other institutions. One professor 
described feeling "a slight thrill as I held a copy of the famous book that never became a book-
as if I had in my hands a samizdat or an artifact." Anthony J. Sebok, Reading The Legal Process, 
94 MICH. L. REv. 1571 (1996). The material did not fmd its way between hard covers until 
1994. HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND ApPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994). On the history of legal-process theory, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. 
Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REv. 2031 (1994). 
33. For a discussion of Fuller's influence on Hart, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra 
note 32, at Ii, Ixxxiii. For an intellectual biography of Fuller, see ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LON L. 
FULLER (1984). 
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which courts developed and applied common law, and the relative in-
stitutional competence of individuals, courts, legislatures, and agencies 
to perform law-making and law-applying functions. 34 
In one respect, all torts casebooks have included opinions that 
specifically touch upon one aspect of legal-process theory, the inter-
play between courts and legislatures, since it lies at the essence of the 
doctrine of negligence per se. 35 The methods utilized by courts to de-
cide whether to adopt and apply as a measure of ordinary care the dic-
tates of a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation not on its face 
applicable to negligence actions constitute one example of how courts 
make indirect use of legislative or administrative pronouncements, a 
subject treated in the Hart and Sacks materials. 36 Hence, torts teachers 
have always dealt consciously or unconsciously with this legal-process 
lssue. 
The first torts casebook to go beyond negligence per se in reflect-
ing legal-process theory was Seavey, Keeton, and Keeton, which in-
cluded a section exploring the relative roles of courts and legislatures 
in serving the common law's competing demands for stability and 
change.37 The cases selected here dealt directly with the judicial over-
ruling of prior case law and incidentally with a particular type of indi-
rect influence cast by statutes on the common law,38 which are matters 
developed at some length in the Hart and Sacks materials. 39 It is 
probably a safe guess that the editor responsible for introducing the 
courts versus legislatures theme into the book was Robert E. Keeton, 
who had previously addressed the problem of judicial overruling in an 
34. Legal-process theory's seminal contribution derived from the original insights it offered 
about the modem regulatory state and the sources and legitimacy of the legal ordering that gov-
erned it. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Legal Process Movement, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1578-80 (2d ed. 1999). 
35. See, e.g" PROSSER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 222-48; SHULMAN & JAMES, supra note 
8, at 225-38. 
36. See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 468-73. Other points in a torts course where dis-
cussion of the indirect use of statutes might be inserted include the relevance of statutory rape 
criminal statutes to the application of the defense of consent in battery actions, as well as the pos-
sible effect of statutes criminalizing failures to aid strangers in peril on claims that courts should 
recognize a tort duty in these kinds of cases. 
37. SEAVEY, KEETON & KEETON, supra note 3, at Ch. 9, § A. 
38. See Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 176 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1961) (overruling prior decisions holding 
driver liable to guest passenger only for willfully or wantonly inflicted injuries and imposing a 
duty of reasonable care owed by driver to guest passenger); see also Spanel v. Mounds View Sch. 
Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962) (overruling governmental tort immunity). In 
Kaminetsky, the court cited a legislative repeal of a statutory exclusion removing guest passengers 
from the protection of a law providing for claims against uninsured motorists as a factor support-
ing its decision to overrule precedent and impose a duty of ordinary care on motorists for the 
protection of guest passengers. 
39. See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 576-84 (overruling common law precedent), 
468-73 (indirect effect of statutes on development of common-law rules and doctrines). 
HeinOnline -- 25 Seattle U. L. Rev. 133 2001-2002
2001] Torts Teaching 133 
article40 and later revisited the theme in a monograph41 (both of which 
revealed the influence of his Harvard confreres Hart, Sacks and 
Fuller).42 
Legal-process concerns, especially as articulated by Fuller, have 
also animated the Henderson and Pearson torts casebook (aptly titled 
The Torts Process), which first appeared in 1975.42 Thus, the treat-
ment of whether or not to recognize a tort duty of due care to rescue 
strangers in peril draws heavily on Fuller's distinction between the 
morality of duty (setting the basic requirements of social living) and 
the morality of aspiration (setting goals of excellence),44 which though 
not specifically mentioned in the Hart and Sacks casebook, falls within 
the parameters of the latter's preoccupation with determining how to 
put proper restraints on judiciallaw-making.45 In a 1973 article argu-
ing for the recognition of limits on the scope of tort liability for the 
negligent or defective design of products, Henderson invoked Fuller's 
concept of polycentricity or the interconnectedness that makes it im-
possible to resolve one issue without affecting a host of related others 
to such an extent that resolution of the issue through adjudication is 
undesirable. 46 Polycentricity is mentioned en passant in Hart and 
Sacks47 and, not surprisingly, is featured prominently in the Hender-
son and Pearson casebook.48 
40. See Robert E. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 462 
(1962). 
41. See ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 
Ch. 1-4 (1969). 
42. In his 1962 article, Keeton cited HART & SACKS, Keeton, supra note 40, at 470 n.17, 
481 n.43, as well as the work of Fuller, id. at 470 n.16. Keeton's continuing preoccupation with 
legal process themes is illustrated by a later article on the availability of punitive damages in 
wrongful death actions. See Robert E. Keeton, Statutes, Gaps, and Values in Tort Law, 44 J. AIR 
L. & COM. 2 (1978) (examining the phenomenon of interstitial law-making by courts when they 
fill in statutory lacunae). 
43. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS (1975). 
Another noteworthy feature of the casebook was its innovative use of problems. 
44. See id. at 499-500 (citing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5-6 (rev. ed. 
1969)). To illustrate the distinction, Fuller uses an analogy drawn by Adam Smith, who likened 
the morality of duty to the rules of grammar and the morality of aspiration to the standards for 
recognizing excellence in literary composition. See id. at 6. 
45. See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 640-47. 
46. James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choices: 
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973). Fuller's use of the notion of poly-
centricity as an argument for judicial self-restraint was not published in fmal form until 1978, 
shortly after his death. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 353 (1978); see also Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False Di-
chotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Model's of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1273, 
1314-20 (1995) (discussing Fuller's conception of polycentricity). 
47. See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 647. 
48. See HENDERSON & PEARSON, supra note 43, at 650. For other articles by Henderson 
applying the jurisprudence of Fuller to tort law, see James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Neg-
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However, Vetri's is the fitst torts casebook to facilitate an exten-
sive consideration of aspects of legal-process theory developed in Hart 
and Sacks. It does so in large part within the precincts of an excellent 
chapter on duty,49 an element of the negligence formula seldom given 
its proper due in torts teaching materials. 50 
Courts are occasionally called on to decide whether or not to rec-
ognize obligations or defenses where none had existed before or where 
prior holdings had refused to recognize them or to modify or eliminate 
obligations or defenses created by prior judicial holdings. This raises 
a fundamental legal process issue: what factors maya court properly 
weigh in reaching such a decision? Moreover, under what circum-
stances might it be appropriate for a court to give dispositive weight to 
its conclusion that the legislature would be the appropriate institution 
to make the change sought by one of the parties to the litigation? Vetri 
encourages discussion of these questions at various points in his duty 
chapter. 51 
The chapter begins with Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. 
Buick Motor Co., 52 which imposes a duty of due care on the assembler 
of a new automobile for the benefit of consumers who might suffer 
harm because of the assembler's failure to exercise adequate precau-
tions. The case enables the teacher to illustrate how a distinguished 
jurist utilized (some might say manipulated) precedent in a creative 
way to make what in effect became new law,53 an exercise that recalls 
the way Hart and Sacks employed the opinion. 54 In addition, Vetri 
poses the question whether the decision in MacPherson caught the 
Buick Motor Company unfairly by surprise, 55 also an issue raised by 
Hart & Sacks. 56 
ligence Concept: Retreatfrom the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 468 (1976); see also James A. Hender-
son, Jr., Process Constraints in Torts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 901 (1982). 
49. See VETRI, supra note 24, at Ch. 3. 
50. One notable exception is MARK F. GRADY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS Ch. 4 
(1994). 
51. See VETRI, supra note 24, at Ch. 3. 
52. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). MacPherson normally makes its appearance in the prod-
ucts liability chapter of torts casebooks. E.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON TORTS 722 (7th ed. 2000). 
53. See id. at 179-80. 
54. See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 545. Spotlighting MacPherson as an exemplifica-
tion of common-law reasoning from precedent is neither recent nor unusual. See EDWARD H. 
LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 7-19 (1949); see also EDGAR 
BODENHEIMER, JOHN BILYEU OAKLEY & JEAN C. LOVE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 94-109 (2d ed. 1988). 
55. VETRI, supra note 24, at 181. 
56. HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 556-57. An interesting discussion point here is the 
extent to which attorneys representing habitual defendants should anticipate changes in settled 
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In a note following MacPherson, Vetri suggests that. in addition 
to precedent, public-policy factors might also have supported the 
holding of the case, and he sets out a list of factors, including deter-
rence, fairness, ease of administration, loss allocation, and consistency 
with legislatively established policy as embodied in existing statutes. 57 
He touches lightly on these factors in his treatment of duty to rescue 58 
and then goes back to them in more detail after his presentation of 
Rowland v. Christian, 59 the California decision imposing on possessors 
of land a duty of ordinary care for the protection of entrants. 
This material opens up the possibility of examining descriptively 
how common-law judges go about making law and normatively if and 
how they should perform this task. The use of policy factors has roots 
in legal realism. Indeed, Leon Green was perhaps the first to invoke 
them systematically in the context of tort law. 60 Hart and Sacks takes a 
more cautious tack here. The editors consider judicial law-making by 
asking whether the opinion in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box CO. 61 
correctly refused to recognize a common-law right to privacy and to 
grant monetary and injunctive relief to the plaintiff for the use of her 
likeness without consent to promote the sale of flour. 62 The editors of 
the casebook appear to be sympathetic to the creation of the new tort. 
In giving their approval, the editors nod toward the arguments of 
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in Warren and Brandeis's 
famous article advocating recognition of a right to privacy and identi-
fying from prior decisions a fundamental principle that protects the 
inviolate personality of the individual. 63 Also, the editors suggest both 
that the right might have derived from" definite and provable patterns 
of popular conduct"64 and a "general community understanding with 
respect to the rightness or wrongfulness of appropriating a person's 
photograph without leave for commercial gain"65 and that it might 
have been implied from the "shared purposes of the members of the 
common law doctrines or rules, and how they should channel such anticipation into practical 
advice for their clients. 
57. VETRI, supra note 24, at 180. 
58. Id. at 196. 
59. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), in VETRI, supra note 24, at 213. 
60. See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 
(1928). 
61. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902), in HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 435. 
62. Id. 
63. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 
193 (1890). 
64. HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 453 
65. Id. 
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community" (a Fuller notion).66 Hart and Sacks' emphasis on careful 
reasoning from basic principles and norms does not eliminate the risk 
that judges might head down the fabled "slippery slope" and end up 
deciding cases on the basis of their personal policy preferences. 67 
Vetri points out this possibility in a succinct "Note on the 
Sources of the Common Law" at the end of the chapter, where he ties 
together the theme of judicial law-making with a synthesis of various 
jurisprudential approaches to the question of the nature of law. 68 
Without encumbering his discussion with labels, he describes the sub-
stance of formalism, legal realism, legal-process theory, and critical le-
gal studies in an effort to provoke thought about what restraints affect 
judges as they exercise their law-making function. 69 
At the close of his section on limited duty for negligently in-
flicted emotional harm, Vetri deals with the related problem of over-
ruling precedent. 70 Since the demands of the doctrine of stare decisis 
require a further finding to the effect that the net gains to be derived 
from disturbing settled law outweigh any negative effects that overrul-
ing might produce, it is not enough for a court to conclude that a prior 
decision had been incorrectly decided or that, if the case had come up 
as a matter of first impression, the court would decide it in a different 
way. Vetri presents the various considerations that a court should 
consider when making this balance/1 and these considerations are con-
sistent with the treatment of overruling in Hart and Sacks. 72 
Placing the overruling issue in the same chapter with material 
dealing with how courts decide cases of first impression makes good 
sense because of the obvious link between the two. Vetri permits the 
instructor to revisit the issue and test student comprehension of it by 
66. Id. It is curious that the editors did not mention natural law and the protections af-
forded to personal privacy by the United States Constitution, justifications given for the holding 
in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), which was the first Ameri-
can decision to recognize a right to privacy in tort. For a comprehensive treatment of the right to 
privacy tort in teaching materials influenced by HART & SACKS, see PAUL J. MISHKIN & 
CLARENCE MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF CASE AND STATUTE LAW Ch. 2 (1965). 
67. Indeed, it is likely that Samuel D. Warren, whose article was instrumental in persuad-
ing courts to recognize a right to privacy in tort, was in fact motivated by his own peculiar atti-
tudes about privacy. See James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. 
L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875 (1979). 
68. VETRI, supra note 24, at 278-82. For a different perspective criticizing legal process 
theory for the restraints it would place on judges faced with law reform issues, see Edmund Ur-
sin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 229 (1981). 
69. For an excellent and comprehensive treatment of common law law-making, see 
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988). 
70. VETRI, supra note 24, at 252-55. 
71. Id. 
72. See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 568-70. 
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including Hoffman v. jones,73 the path-breaking Florida decision over-
ruling precedent and replacing contributory negligence with compara-
tive fault, in a later chapter on defenses and immunities.74 
The question of relative institutional competence is a fundamen-
tal concern of legal-process theory.75 However, there is a difficulty 
raising it with first-semester, first-year students, who are in the throes 
of a struggle to understand the judicial process and have had little or 
no exposure to the legislative process. Hence, making meaningful 
comparisons between the two institutions can be problematic. 
The one obvious moment in the torts course when this might be 
raised is in connection with the common-law rule providing that com-
pliance with a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation is not 
due care per se, but only some evidence from which a jury might infer 
reasonable conduct. 76 The complexities of the issue come to light even 
more sharply in the product liability context with debate about 
whether compliance with product safety regulations promulgated by a 
federal agency should relieve manufacturers from liability.77 Unfortu-
nately, there is too much here for first-year students to handle rea-
sonably. 
In one of the notes after Rowland, Vetri opens the floor to a dis-
cussion of whether courts should undertake the reform of common law 
rules and doctrines or whether the task should be left to legislatures. 78 
In opening this discussion, Vetri gives the instructor an opportunity at 
least to flag this classic legal-process concern.79 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Vetri casebook represents an interesting and thoroughly 
worthwhile effort to permit instructors to reach both ends of the class 
curve. The learning aids located at strategic points in the text provide 
important substantive and psychological help for those finding it diffi-
73. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), in VETRI, supra note 24, at 531. 
74. Id. 
75. See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 112, 158-67. On the importance of this concept 
to the formulation of a modernized legal-process theory, see Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal 
Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393 
(1996). 
76. The rule is tersely stated in VETRI, supra note 24, at 106 n.l0. 
77. For thorough coverage of the issue, see Symposium, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense 
to Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000). 
78. See VETRI, supra note 24, at 218 n.3. 
79. Hart and Sacks raise the issue in the context of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice 
Brandeis in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (Brandeis, J.. dis-
senting). HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 536. However, contrary to their usual practice, the 
editors surprisingly offer no extended commentary on the factors Brandeis lists as supporting 
judicial deference to legislatures. 
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cult to catch on to the uniqueness of the study of law, while the edi-
tor's occasional forays into legal-process theory should invigorate 
those in need of intellectual challenge. At the same time, the mass of 
students between the two extremes can be made to feel more comfort-
able with the basics of tort law and less hesitant to take an occasional 
plunge into deeper waters with their more adventurous classmates. 
